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ἄμφω from the Iliad (VII 255, XXIII 686, H. Cer. 15, ἄμ' ἀμφοτέρῃσιν H. Merc. 39) may perhaps be thought to determine the question in favor of ἄμα.

I suppose, therefore, that Schneider was *right* in his earlier view (1851), *wrong* in his later (1870). Not only is it extremely likely that Callimachus would distinguish *μιν* from *νιν*, and (at least in the same poem) confine *μιν* to a masculine object, using *νιν* when he speaks of a female; but the sentence, as Schneider prints it in 1851, p. 519:

ἃ μὲν ἄμ' ἀμφοτέραισι φίλον περὶ παῖδα λαβοῖσα
 μάτηρ μιν γοερῶν οἶκτον ἠρδονίδων
 ἄγε βαρὺ κλαίωσα. θεὰ δ' ἔλεησεν ἑταίραν κ. τ. λ.

may be added to the other instances of that involution of clauses which, as is well known, the Alexandrian poets affected. Theocr. XXIX 3, Epigr. XIX 1, Callim. fr. 445 οὐδ' ὄθεν οἶδεν ὀδεύει Θνητὸς ἀνὴρ, Epigr. XLIV 2. This is, I believe, the true explanation of the much disputed passage of Val. Flaccus V 685-7:

Donec et Aeeten inopis post longa senectae
 Exilia, heu magnis quantum licet, inopia, fatis!
 Nata iuuet, graiusque nepos in regna reponat,

where *inopia*, a fem. agreeing with *nata* and referring to Aeetes' daughter Medea, is *interjected* into the exclamatory clause *heu magnis quantum licet fatis!*

ROBINSON ELLIS.

ON PARMENIDES 162 A. B.

This passage Grote pronounces to him "hardly intelligible." The reader who consults Hermann's text or Jowett's translation will receive little enlightenment. In spite of its subtlety, however, the passage is not really difficult when we have once grasped the main thought, and it admits, I think, of easy emendation. It occurs in the middle of the sixth argument of Parmenides, that is, to adopt the technical divisions of the dialogue, in the first half of the third antinomy: on the negative hypothesis that the one is not, εἰ μὴ ἔστι τὸ ἓν, Plato is demonstrating the coexistence of contraries in the relative or cognizable one. In 160 E he has shown, by hypothesis, that we cannot affirm being ("is") of the one, although we may affirm "participation" in attributes.

He now attempts to prove, on the contrary, that such "participation" in attributes implicitly affirms being ("is"). The argument is based on the familiar ambiguity of the copula. Predication is impossible without the copula; and the copula "is" posits the subject as "existing." Premising thus much, I will give first the text of Hermann and Stallbaum, with the translation of Jowett, and then what I conceive to be the emended text with a somewhat closer version of my own. Hermann prints:

ἔστιν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ἐν οὐκ ὄν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἔσται μὴ ὄν, ἀλλὰ τι τοῦ εἶναι ἀνήσει πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἶναι, εὐθὺς ἔσται ὄν. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. Δεῖ ἄρα αὐτὸ δεσμὸν ἔχειν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι τὸ εἶναι μὴ ὄν, εἰ μέλλει μὴ εἶναι, ὁμοίως ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔχειν μὴ εἶναι, ἵνα τελέως αὐ εἶναι ᾗ. οὕτως γὰρ ἂν τό τε ὄν μάλιστ' ἂν εἴη, καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν οἷα ἂν εἴη, μετέχοντα τὸ μὲν ὄν οὐσίας τοῦ εἶναι ὄν, μὴ οὐσίας δὲ τοῦ εἶναι μὴ ὄν, εἰ μέλλει τελέως εἶναι, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν μὴ οὐσίας μὲν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι μὴ ὄν, οὐσίας δὲ τοῦ εἶναι μὴ ὄν, εἰ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν αὐ τελέως μὴ ἔσται.

Jowett renders (his text cannot differ essentially from Hermann's, and his translation is apparently an attempt to render the German version in Stallbaum's note):

Then, as would appear, the one has no existence, for if it were not to be non-existent, but to admit something of existence into non-existence (or "to remit something of the existence of not-being") it would at once become being. Quite true.

Then non-existence, if it is to maintain itself, must have the existence of not-being as the bond of not-being, just as existence must have as a bond the non-existence of not-being in order to perfect its own existence; for the truest assertion of being and of not-being is when being partakes of the existence of the existent and of the non-existence of the existence of the non-existent—that is, the perfection of existence; and when the non-existent as non-existent partakes both of the non-existence of not-being and of the existence of being—that is, the perfection of non-existence.

With one or two easy transpositions, the insertion of *μὴ* in one place, its omission in another, and one change of *εἶναι* to *ὄν*, I would restore the passage as follows:

ἔστιν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ἐν οὐκ ὄν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἔσται μὴ ὄν, ἀλλὰ τι τοῦ εἶναι ἀνήσει πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἶναι, εὐθὺς ἔσται ὄν. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. Δεῖ ἄρα αὐτὸ δεσμὸν ἔχειν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι τὸ εἶναι μὴ ὄν, εἰ μέλλει μὴ εἶναι, ὁμοίως ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν ἔχειν [δεῖ?] τὸ μὴ εἶναι μὴ ὄν, ἵνα τελέως αὐ [ὄν?] ᾗ. οὕτως γὰρ ἂν τό τε ὄν μάλιστ' ἂν εἴη καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν οὐκ ἂν εἴη, μετέχοντα τὸ μὲν ὄν οὐσίας

τοῦ εἶναι ὄν, μὴ οὐσίας δὲ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι μὴ ὄν, εἰ μέλλει τελέως εἶναι, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν μὴ οὐσίας μὲν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι ὄν, οὐσίας δὲ τοῦ εἶναι μὴ ὄν, εἰ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν αὐτὸ τελέως μὴ ἔσται.

The text thus emended I would translate as follows, observing that it is necessary for clearness to eschew in such passages as this the misleading English "exist."

The one as non-being then has being, for if it is not to *be* non-being, but is to relax anything of its being in relation to not being (or preferably "is to remit anything of its being in the direction of not being"; cf. Republic, 479c) it will at once be being. Quite so.

It must, therefore, have as a bond of its not being its *being non-being* if it is not to be, just as being in order to really be being must have the not being non-being. For thus, and thus only, can being most completely be and non-being not be, namely, if they respectively participate, being in essence in order to be being and in non-essence in order not to be non-being, if it is to be entirely; non-being, on the other hand, in non-essence in order not to be being, and in essence in order to be non-being, if non-being in turn is to be not entirely.

I will now comment on text and version together. Much commentary will hardly be required. Manuscript evidence I have none, nor would it be of much value if we had it. Let the reader copy a few pages of the Parmenides and he will not be inclined to cavil at the assumption of a few transpositions or omitted particles. The proof of the reading given is that it makes sense and grammar of what was neither grammar nor sense.

In the first clause Jowett takes ἔστιν as copula and οὐκ ὄν as predicate. I take ἔστιν absolutely as the context requires, since it is existence that Plato is trying to fasten on the assumed non-existent, and τὸ ἐν οὐκ ὄν must then be, what it obviously is in 162 E, (τὸ ἐν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ ὄν ἔστηκε τε καὶ κινεῖται) the unum non-ens of the hypothesis.

The meaning of the next clause is, perhaps, made sufficiently plain by the distinction I have been careful to maintain between not being (μὴ εἶναι) and non-being (τὸ μὴ ὄν). Of the two renderings of πρὸς suggested—the first means "if non-being shall lose the copula that binds it to being in the sentence 'non-being *is* not being'"; the second means "if non-being in its aversion to any affirmative copula should even negative again the binding copula so as to yield the statement 'non-being cannot *be* not being'"; the

obvious thought thus subtly complicated is the same on either version. Non-being would contradict itself and become being. Jowett I do not understand.

The transposition I have made in the text after *ὁμοίως* makes the meaning clearer, but is perhaps not absolutely necessary. We may have here one of those hyperbata which are so remarkable a feature of Plato's later, or, as I prefer to say, more elaborate style. The change of *εἶναι* to *ᾧ* after *τελέως* in the following clause, or the omission of *εἶναι* is absolutely required. Either is possible; cf. *ἔσται ᾧ* just above and *εἷη* just below, both used for emphatic assertion of "existence." *εἶναι ᾧ* cannot be construed.

In the following sentence *εἶναι* occurs with the genitive of the article four times. Jowett, probably following Stallbaum, construes each as a "possessive" genitive of the articular infinitive. I think we have here hitherto unnoticed examples of the consecutive or final infinitive. The construction is rare but not unexampled in Plato (cf. *Gorgias* 457 E, *Republic* 518 D). It is required here by the thought and by the grammatical impossibility of the other construction. The whole context shows how familiar final forms of expression are to Plato in this connection. The subject must be assumed to admit a certain predicate *in order to* a certain inference. The expression of this idea of finality is quite varied (cf. *ἵνα τελέως ᾧ* above, *εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι* below, *εἰ μέλλει* in this sentence, and the striking example 141 E οὐδ' ἄρα οὕτως ἔστιν ὥστε ἐν εἶναι). Why may it not take the form of the final infinitive here? Surely the thought is that both being and non-being *in order to retain* their nature must admit so much of their opposites as is involved in affirmative and negative predication.

In any case the received construction is inadmissible. Throughout this part of the *Parmenides*, with his usual stylistic tact, Plato is careful to employ *φύσις*, *εἶδος*, αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν and similar phrases for particular essences, reserving *οὐσία*, *οὐσίας μετέχειν* and the like for the essence of existence generally.

The participation in *the essence* of a particular idea requires the article in Greek as well as in English. And the rule is not changed by the fact that we are here dealing with the essences of being and non-being. Plato himself speaks of the essence of non-being in the *Politicus* (286 B), and his phrase is *τῆς τοῦ μὴ ὄντος οὐσίας*. It is impossible to construe *μὴ οὐσίας τοῦ εἶναι μὴ ᾧ*, as Jowett does, "of the non-existence of the existence of the non-existent." Adopting my construction, the reason for the slight

change I have made in the text is clear. If being partakes of essence in order to be being, its object in partaking of non-essence can only be not to be non-being. We must read $\mu\eta\ \alpha\iota\sigma\iota\alpha\varsigma\ \delta\epsilon\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\ \mu\ \eta\ \epsilon\iota\upsilon\alpha\iota\ \mu\eta\ \delta\upsilon\nu$, inserting $\mu\eta$ before $\epsilon\iota\upsilon\alpha\iota$. This $\mu\eta$ can be easily taken from the succeeding line where it is superfluous. Non-being partakes of non-essence with a view to not being being—we must read $\tau\omicron\ \delta\epsilon\ \mu\eta\ \delta\upsilon\nu\ \mu\eta\ \alpha\iota\sigma\iota\alpha\varsigma\ \mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\ \mu\eta\ \epsilon\iota\upsilon\alpha\iota\ \delta\upsilon\nu$, omitting $\mu\eta$ before the last $\delta\upsilon\nu$.

A further confirmation of the proposed reading may be found in the last chapter of the first book of the Prior Analytics. Aristotle is there discussing negative predication with reference to the distinction between $\mu\eta\ \epsilon\iota\upsilon\alpha\iota\ \tau\omicron\delta\epsilon$ and $\epsilon\iota\upsilon\alpha\iota\ \mu\eta\ \tau\omicron\delta\epsilon$. In 51b³⁶ he draws up a list of four typical forms as follows :

$\tau\omicron\ \epsilon\iota\upsilon\alpha\iota\ \acute{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\theta\acute{\omicron}\nu$. .	denoted by	A
$\tau\omicron\ \mu\eta\ \epsilon\iota\upsilon\alpha\iota\ \acute{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\theta\acute{\omicron}\nu$		"	B
$\tau\omicron\ \epsilon\iota\upsilon\alpha\iota\ \mu\eta\ \acute{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\theta\acute{\omicron}\nu$		"	Γ
$\tau\omicron\ \mu\eta\ \epsilon\iota\upsilon\alpha\iota\ \mu\eta\ \acute{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\theta\acute{\omicron}\nu$		"	Δ

After observing that everything is either A or B, but nothing can be both, and that everything is either Γ or Δ, but nothing can be both, he goes on to point out that B necessarily follows from Γ and Δ from A.

That is to say, he points out that $\tau\omicron\ \epsilon\iota\upsilon\alpha\iota\ \mu\eta\ \acute{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\theta\acute{\omicron}\nu$ (or generalizing with Plato $\tau\omicron\ \epsilon\iota\upsilon\alpha\iota\ \mu\eta\ \delta\upsilon\nu$) implies $\tau\omicron\ \mu\eta\ \epsilon\iota\upsilon\alpha\iota\ \acute{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\theta\acute{\omicron}\nu\ (\delta\upsilon\nu)$, and that $\tau\omicron\ \epsilon\iota\upsilon\alpha\iota\ \acute{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\theta\acute{\omicron}\nu\ (\delta\upsilon\nu)$ implies $\tau\omicron\ \mu\eta\ \epsilon\iota\upsilon\alpha\iota\ \mu\eta\ \acute{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\theta\acute{\omicron}\nu\ (\delta\upsilon\nu)$. And this is just our proposed reading of Plato, according to which $\tau\omicron\ \delta\upsilon\nu$ partakes of $\mu\eta\ \alpha\iota\sigma\iota\alpha\varsigma$ in order $\mu\eta\ \epsilon\iota\upsilon\alpha\iota\ \mu\eta\ \delta\upsilon\nu$, and $\tau\omicron\ \mu\eta\ \delta\upsilon\nu$ partakes of $\mu\eta\ \alpha\iota\sigma\iota\alpha\varsigma$ in order $\mu\eta\ \epsilon\iota\upsilon\alpha\iota\ \delta\upsilon\nu$. The received reading ($\epsilon\iota\upsilon\alpha\iota\ \mu\eta\ \delta\upsilon\nu$ and $\mu\eta\ \epsilon\iota\upsilon\alpha\iota\ \mu\eta\ \delta\upsilon\nu$ respectively) cannot be explained by Aristotle's scheme.

As this is a somewhat dreary and technical fable, I may be permitted to deduce one general lesson from it in conclusion. Studied in the light of a fair familiarity with Greek idiom and elementary logic, the Parmenides is neither a very difficult nor a very obscure writing. $\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\ \lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omega$, $\alpha\iota\delta\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \pi\omicron\iota\kappa\iota\lambda\omicron\nu$ says Socrates reassuringly when his bewildered interlocutor suspects a deep mystery in his words, and $\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\ \lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\epsilon\iota$, $\alpha\iota\delta\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \pi\omicron\iota\kappa\iota\lambda\omicron\nu$ is often the final word of the Platonist who endeavors to hold a middle course between the Scylla of neo-Platonic mysticism and the awful Charybdis of the statistics of $\tau\acute{\iota}\ \mu\eta\nu$.

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